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THE PROPOSED PRODUCTS LIABILITY
RESTATEMENT: A MISGUIDED REVISION
Hon. George C. Pratt:
We are going to continue ahead with Professor Phillips.
Professor Jeny Phillips*:
Thank you, Judge Pratt, members of the panel, ladies and
gentlemen. If I can begin by addressing the initial question that
was talked about this morning of dividing products liability into
three categories of defect: 1 manufacturing flaw, 2 the design flaw3
and the absence or inadequacy of warning. 4
* W.P. Toms Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of
Law. B.A., Yale University 1956; M.A., Cambridge University 1958; J.D.,
Yale Law School 1961.
1. See W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEErON ON THE LAw OF
TORTS § 99, at 695 (5th ed. 1984). Section 99 states in relevant part that "in
strict liability... the product must be defective in the kind of way that
subjects persons or tangible property to an unreasonable risk of harm." Id.
Furthermore, § 99 states that:
a product is defective as marketed... for any of the following reasons:
(1) a flaw in the product that was present in the product at the time the
defendant sold it; (2) a failure by the producer or assembler of a product
adequately to warn of a risk or hazard related to the way the product
was designed; or (3) a defective design.
Id.
2. See KEErON Er AL., supra note 1, at 695. Section 99 defines the term
"manufacturing defect" as a "flaw that is created in the construction or
marketing processes [which] makes the product unreasonably dangerous as a
matter of law since it causes the product to be more dangerous than it was
designed to be." Id. See also Delzotti v. LaFrance, 179 A.D.2d 497, 579
N.Y.S.2d 33 (lst Dep't 1992). In DeIzotti, plaintiff Firefighter, who was
injured "when a folding step on a fire truck gave way, causing him to fall,"
sued manufacturer of fire truck, claiming that his injuries were caused by
manufacturing defect which occurred due to 'metallurgical deficiencies.' Id. at
497, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 33-34.
3. See KEErON ET AL., supra note 1, at 698. According to § 99, the
courts use two different approaches when deciding whether a particular design
is hazardous to the point of making the product "unreasonably dangerous."
1
Phillips: A Misguided Revision
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1993
TOURO LA W REVIEW
The approaches are: (1) the "consumer-contemplation test," where a product is
found to be "defectively dangerous if it is dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchased it with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to the product's
characteristics" and, (2) the risk-utility test, under which approach, "a product
is defective as designed if ... the magnitude of the danger outweighs the
utility of the product." Id.; see also Raney v. Honeywell, Inc., 540 F.2d 932,
935 (8th Cir. 1976) (determining whether a gas control valve had a design
defect depended upon a balancing test weighing "seriousness of harm against
the costs of taking precautions"); Haran v. Union Carbide Corp., 68 N.Y.2d
710, 711, 497 N.E.2d 678, 679, 506 N.Y.S.2d 311, 312 (1986) (stating that a
"product's risks must be balanced against its utility and affordability, and
against the risks, utility and costs of alternatively designed products. .. .");
Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 461 N.E.2d 864, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378 (1984);
Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 450 N.E.2d 204, 463
N.Y.S.2d 398 (1983). In Voss, the New York Court of Appeals held that
several factors must be examined in balancing the risks inherent in a product's
design:
1) the utility of the product to the public as a whole and to the
individual user; 2) the nature of the product ... ; 3) the availability of
a safer design; 4) the potential for designing ... the product so that it is
safer but... functional and reasonably priced; 5) the ability of the
plaintiff to have avoided injury ... ; 6) the degree of awareness of the
potential danger of the product reasonably attributed to the plaintiff; and
7) the manufacturer's ability to spread... cost[s] related to improving
the safety of the design.
Id. at 109, 450 N.E.2d at 208-09, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 402.; see also Fallon v.
Clifford B. Hannay & Son, Inc., 153 A.D.2d 95, 99, 550 N.Y.S.2d 135, 137
(3d Dep't 1989) (applying several factors adopted in Voss to determine
whether risks outweigh utility of a manufacturer's hose reel).
4. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 1, at 697. According to § 99, a
product may be found to be defective if there is a failure to warn or a failure to
adequately warn "about a risk or hazard related to the way a product is
designed." Id. A manufacturer will not be held liable unless it is shown that
the manufacturer "knew or should have known of the risk or hazard about
which he failed to warn." Id.; see also Jackson v. Coast Paint and Lacquer
Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974). According to the Jackson court:
On the issue of the duty to warn.., the question.., is "whether the
danger or potentiality of danger, is generally known and recognized"
[and) whether the product as sold was "dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with ordinary knowledge common to the community. .. ."
Id.; Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 432 A.2d 925, 932 (N.J. 1981)
(stating that "a products liability charge in an inadequate warning case must
[Vol 10152
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Victor Schwartz, 5 I believe, advocated that kind of division
with the proposed uniform law that he drafted fifteen years ago.6
focus on safety and emphasize that a manufacturer ... has not satisfied its
duty to warn, even if the product is perfectly inspected, designed, and
manufactured.. . ."); Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 276, 461 N.E.2d
864, 871, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 386 (1984). The New York Court of Appeals,
in Cover, held that the nature of a warning depends upon a number of factors:
[1] the harm that may result from use of the product without notice, [2]
the reliability and any possible adverse interest of the person... to
whom notice is given, [3] the burden to the manufacturer or vendor
involved in locating [necessary] persons ... , [4] the attention which it
can be expected a notice in the form given will receive from the
recipient, [5] the kind of product involved and the number
manufactured... and [6] steps taken.., to correct the problem.
Id.; Power v. Crown Equip. Corp., 189 A.D.2d 310, 313, 596 N.Y.S.2d 38,
39 (1st Dep't 1993) (holding that manufacturer will be held liable for failing to
act reasonably in providing an appropriate warning); Young v. Robershaw
Controls Co., 104 A.D.2d 84, 87, 481 N.Y.S.2d 891, 894 (3d Dep't 1984)
(holding that there is a continuing duty to warn of defects); c£f Goldberg v.
Union Hardware Co., 162 A.D.2d 658, 658-59, 557 N.Y.S.2d 104, 105 (2d
Dep't 1990) (holding that absence of consumer complaints as to adequacy of
product supports a jury's verdict that a manufacturer did not breach a duty to
warn consumers); Belling v. Haugh's Pools, Ltd., 126 A.D.2d 958, 959, 511
N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (4th Dep't 1987) (stating that "there is no liability for
failure to warn of obvious danger....").
5. Victor E. Schwartz obtained a B.A. summa cur laude from Boston
University in 1962, and his J.D. magna cum laude from Columbia University
in 1965. tHe is author of V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLI ENCE (2d ed.
1986); co-author of W. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS
(8th ed. 1988), V. SCHWARTZ Er AL.., GuiDE To MULTISTATE LmGATION
(1985), and V. SCHWARTZ Er AL., PRoDuCT LiABIurY: CASES AND TRENDS
(Prentice Hall 1987). Mr. Schwartz is also a drafter of the Uniform Product
Liability Act. See also infra note 6 for information on the Act.
6. UNFORM PRODUCT LIABILrY ACT, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,721
(1979) [hereinafter UPLA]. Section 104 states that a product can be found
defective if: "(1) It was unreasonably unsafe in construction [Subsection A];
(2) It was unreasonably unsafe in design [Subsection B]; (3) It was
unreasonably unsafe because adequate warnings or instructions were not
provided [Subsection C .... " Id. Before the enactment of the UPLA, the
issue of identifying basic standards of responsibility to which product
manufacturers are to be held, generated much controversy. See, e.g., Richard
A. Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C. L.
REV. 643, 648 (1978) (stating that two sources of change in modem products
liability are "expansion of the concept of defect in products liability actions"
1993]
3
Phillips: A Misguided Revision
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1993
154 TOUROLAWREVIEW [Vol 10
I have never been able to make that distinction in my mind or see
the value in that categorization, 7 and I am not sure whether
Professors Henderson and Twerski still adhere to that view, 8 but
there is an excellent case on this point demonstrating the futility
of making that kind of distinction, 9 not from the frequency point
and "restriction of defenses based upon plaintiff's conduct .... "); see also
Victor E. Schwartz, The Death of "Super Strict Liability": Common Sense
Returns to Tort Law, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 179 (1991-92). Mr. Schwartz defines
"super strict liability" as "liability... even though the manufacturer neither
knew nor could have known about the risk imposed by the design," where
"there was no safer way to make the product given the existing technology."
Id. at 179. Mr. Schwartz, as well as does the UPLA, agree that applying
"super strict liability" is "inappropriate for defective-design and failure-to-
warn cases" since it is unsound public policy to put a burden on the
manufacturers to make their products safer than is possible under existing
technology. Id. at 180.
7. UPLA, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,724. Section 104 specifically categorizes the
types of product defects under which the manufacturer can be held liable.
8. See Aaron D. Twerski, From A Reporter: A Prospective Agenda, 10
TouRo L. REv. 5 (1993). See also James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D.
Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1516 (1992) (recognizing need for
distinct categories of defects since "the rule developed for manufacturing
defects is inappropriate for the resolution of design and warning defect
eases.... "); cf Aaron D. Twerski & Alvin S. Weinstein, A Critique of the
Uniform Product Liability Law - A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REV.
221, 223 (1978-79). According to Twerski and Weinstein,
Many of the ideas presented by the U[niform] Plroducts] L[iability]
L[aw] have enormous potential for inclusion into the common law
development of products liability over the next decade, but they will
require the careful hand of the courts to assure that such doctrines are
developed through careful attention to the varying fact patterns which
create the rich tapestry of products liability law. It is much too early for
legislation to pre-empt the creativity of the common law in the
continuing development of products liability law.
Id.
9. John F. Vargo, Caveat Emptor: Will the A.L.L Erode Strict Liability
in the Restatement (Third) For Products Laibility?, 10 TOURO L. REv. 21
(1993). See also Brady v. Melody Homes Mfr., 589 P.2d 896 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1978). In Brady, the court recognized that the distinctions among manufacturer
defect, design defect, and failure to warn defect become "blurred or
meaningless in particular cases." Id. at 898; Dion v. Graduate Hosp., 520
A.2d 876, 880 (Pa. 1987) (holding that "[t]here are difficulties in thinking of
4
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of view which Mr. Vargo mentioned, 10 but in another vein
entirely.
That case is Bryan v. John Bean Division of FMC Corp.11
There, the court found that the plaintiff stated a cause of action
for both manufacturing defect and design defect. 12 The
manufacturing defect resulted from the method of control,
supervision and testing, which as the court said, was a design
decision. 13
It seems to me that manufacturing defects are typically a result
of design decisions of how to control, how to monitor and how to
produce your product. 14 These are inextricably interrelated. 15
an inadequate warnings case as a products liability case... " since nothing is
alleged to be wrong with product's design in a warnings case).
10. Vargo, supra note 9. The frequency point of view, according to Mr.
Vargo, is a theory that helps distinguish between a manufacturing defect and a
design defect. As the frequency of the occurrence of product defect increases,
there is a greater likelihood that it is a design defect..
11. 566 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1978).
12. Id. at 549 (holding that designer who distributed cast-iron tool could
be liable for design and manufacturing defects when both defects caused the
product to be unreasonably dangerous).
13. Id at 547-48. In Bryan, in a special finding, the jury, found that the
design specifications provided by defendant John Bean Corporation to third
party defendant Midland-Ross, the Foundry that cast the product, were
inadequate. Due to this inadequacy, the product, as cast by Midland-Ross, was
too hard and brittle to perform as intended. Id. at 547. The implication was
that had the design blueprint sufficiently established hardness specifications for
the product, there would not have been a manufacturing defect.
14. But see Lesnefsky v. Fischer & Porter Co., 527 F. Supp. 951, 955
(E.D. Pa. 1981) which discusses that "a manufacturer. . . under § 402A[,]
who produces a component part in accordance with the specifications of a
buyer[,] is not liable for the part's defective design unless manufacturer has or
should have knowledge that product is unsafe for the use intended . . .";
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUrS LIABILITY LAW 69 (Quorum Books
1980). According to Epstein's treatise,
[Manufacturing] defect cases presuppose that the design is safe but insist
that the product is dangerous because it does not conform to the design.
Design defect cases presuppose that the product conforms to design but
insist that the design itself is unsafe. Construction defects arise because
of occasional miscarriages in the manufacturing process; design defects
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And if the Restaters try to make a distinction between the two, it
will cause the courts, the plaintiffs, the defense attorneys, and
others to fight battles that should not be fought. 16
Moreover, there is never mentioned in this categorization a
fourth type of defect, which I have always contended is clearly a
type of defect. This type of defect is misrepresentation, 17 either
Id.
15. But see UPLA, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 § 104 (1979) for a discussion of
the distinction between manufacturing defects and design defects. Id. at
62,721. A manufacturer will be strictly liable for a manufacturing defect if,
"when the product left the control of the manufacturer, the product deviated in
some material way from the manufacturer's design specifications or
performance standards, or from otherwise identical units of the same product
line." Id. However, whether a manufacturer will be found liable under a
design defect theory is determined by weighing "the likelihood that the
product would cause the claimant's harm or similar harms... [against] the
burden on the manufacturer to design a product that would have prevented
those harms...." Id; Mitchell v. Lone Star Ammunition, Inc., 913 F.2d 242,
248 (5th Cir. 1990) (following reasoning of the Supreme Court in Boyle v.
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988), the court determined that it
would be unfair to find a manufacturer liable for a design defect where product
was constructed according to government specifications); Leeds v. Cincinnati,
Inc., 732 F.2d 1194, 1197 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that a manufacturer would
be strictly liable for manufacturing defects but would not be strictly liable for
design defects unless design is "unreasonable").
16. See, e.g., Hutto v. BIC Corp., 800 F. Supp. 1367, 1371 (E.D. Va.
1992) (stating that "whether this defect [in defendant's lighter] is the result of
a 'design' defect or a 'manufacturing' defect may not be material; what is
material is that there is evidence that the cause of this defect is either BIC's
design of the lighter or its manufacture of the lighter. . . ."); Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 501 P.2d 1153, 1163 (Cal. 1972) (suggesting that distinction
between manufacturing defects and design defects is not justified, considering
the additional burden placed upon plaintiffs trying to prove design defects).
According to the Cronin court, "[i]t is difficult to prove that a product
ultimately caused injury because a widget was poorly welded--a defect in
manufacture--rather than because it was made of inexpensive metal difficult to
weld, chosen by a designer concerned with economy--a defect in design." Id.
at 1163. Therefore, this court was unwilling to "providje] such a battleground
for clever counsel." Id.
17. See Hutchinson Utils. Comm'n v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 775 F.2d
231, 238 (8th Cir. 1985). In order to establish an intentional misrepresentation
claim, a defendant must:
[Vol 10
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culpable 18 or innocent. 19 If you read the seminal case of
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products., Inc.,20 Justice Traynor
[make] a false representation of a past or existing material fact,
susceptible of knowledge, knowing it to be false or without knowing
whether it was true or false, with the intention of inducing the person to
whom it was made to act in reliance upon it or under such circumstances
that such person was justified in so acting and was thereby deceived or
induced to so act to his damage.
Id.; KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, § 106, at 736-37. Misrepresentation may be
through oral or written words, by "[m]erely... entering into some
transactions," by making statements which "create a false impression in the
mind of the hearer," or by "active concealment of the truth." Id.; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965) (stating that "[o]ne engaged
in the business of selling... is subject to liability [for
misrepresentation]... even though [the misrepresentation] is not made
fraudulently or negligently .... ").
18. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 1, at 741. Culpable, or intentional,
misrepresentation "involves the intent that a representation shall be made, that
it shall be directed to a particular person or class of persons, that it shall
convey a certain meaning, that it shall be believed, and that it shall be acted
upon in a certain way." Id. at 745.
19. See Banco Totta E Acores v. Fleet Nat. Bank, 768 F. Supp. 943
(D.R.I. 1991). The Banco court held that a claim for recission failed under the
theory of innocent misrepresentation, since the remedy of recission was
inappropriate where a plaintiff could not be restored to his or her original
status. Id. Furthermore, according to this court, an additional element was
necessary to establish a claim for innocent misrepresentation. Id. "ITihe
plaintiff must have justifiably relied on the representation, mistaken or
deceitful, [which was] made by the defendant." Id. at 948; see also Dixie-
Portland Flour Mills v. Nation Enters., Inc., 613 F. Supp. 985, 989 (N.D. I1l.
1985) (stating that "[teo be liable for negligent misrepresentation, a defendant
must be in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others in
their business transactions...."); Halpert v. Rosenthal, 267 A.2d 730, 735
(R.I. 1970) (recognizing that a false, though innocent, misrepresentation of
fact can be a basis for recission of a contract since "the misrepresenter's good
faith is immaterial.") Id. at 735; KEETON Er AL., supra note 1, at 741.
Innocent, or negligent misrepresentation involves a statement "made with an
honest belief in its truth" which nevertheless, "because of lack of reasonable
care in ascertaining the facts, or in the manner of expression, or absence of the
skill and competence required by a particular business or profession" is
negligent. Id. Alfred Hill, Damages for Innocent Misrepresentation, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 679, 690 (1973) (stating that innocent misrepresentation
occurs where defendant "makes an unqualified assertion of a fact that is
susceptible of knowledge, and the assertion turns out to be untrue .... ").
1993] 157
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made the point, amongst other things, as a basic reason for
adopting strict liability, that "[i]mplicit in [a product's] presence
on the market" is a "representation that it [will] safely do the
jobs for which it was built." 21 This, combined with all the
marketing, advertising and other methods that manufacturers and
product suppliers use to sell their products, creates a consumer
expectation of safety and usability.22
Twenty years ago, Professor Shapo of Northwestern University
wrote a major article in the Virginia Law Review23 in which he
contended, I think quite correctly, that products liability is shot
through with aspects of both express and implicit
representation. 24 All courts, with the exception perhaps of
20. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
21. Id. at 901. See also Dean v. General Motors Corp., 301 F. Supp. 187,
190-91 (E.D. La. 1969) (stating that "[t]he design must measure up to what
the community is entitled to expect of those who persuade the public to buy
their products . . ").
22. See, e.g., Adkins v. GAF Corp., 923 F.2d 1225, 1228 (6th Cir. 1991)
(requiring that "[t]he packaging of a product is... an element to consider
when determining whether the consumer would reasonably expect the content
of the package to pose the danger it did."); Hauter v. Zogarts, 534 P.2d 377,
382-83 (Cal. 1975) (stating that where label on shipping carton and instruction
book of golf training device urged players to drive ball with full power and
further stated "COMPLETELY SAFE BALL WILL NOT HIT PLAYER," it
was reasonable to infer that consumer would believe the device safe for all
levels of ability); Tirino v. Kenner Prods. Co., 72 Misc. 2d 1094, 1095, 341
N.Y.S.2d 61, 64 (Civ. Ct. 1973) (explaining that liability would be imposed
where plaintiff used a product that was labeled "Non-Toxic" in exact way as
depicted on the product's packaging).
23. Marshall Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection:
Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA.
L. REV. 1109 (1974).
24. Id. at 1158. While express representations are statements specifically
made about a product's quality, usefulness, etc., implicit representations are
beliefs reasonably illicited about a product indirectly. According to Shapo:
A cause of action exists, at a minimum, for untrue product
representations made in a context which includes the defendant's
knowledge or quasi-knowledge of their falsity. This context typically
also includes the plaintiffs ignorance of the true facts, a deficiency
which quite infrequently is known to the defendant and which usually is
justified by customary practice concerning that kind of purchase.
Id. In cases of implicit representations, Shapo declares that:
8
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California in Brown v. Superior Court,25 in dictum, say where
you have a misrepresentation case, you have true strict liability. 26
I do not think that we can ignore the representational aspects of
products liability in determining whether a product is defective,
nor should it be pulled out as a separate basis under section 402B
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 27 It is an integral part of
402A liability. 28
The question should be whether the product image that falls on the
consciousness of the purchaser as revealed by the seller varies
significantly from the objective facts about the aspect of the product at
issue, surely those known to the seller. [Therefore,1 [t]he notion of the
representation becomes redefined to include a larger field of
communication, and the representation, however communicated,
receives more realistic examination with respect both to the production
and reception of the image.
Id. at 1163-64 (emphasis added); see Marshall Shapo, PRODUCTS LIABUMrrY
AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE (forthcoming 1993).
25. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) (stating that strict liability does not apply to
drug manufacturer who makes misrepresentation with regard to purpose for
which drug is prescribed).
26. See Badger Pharmacal Inc. v. Wisconsin Pharmacal Co., I F.3d 621,
622 n.1 (7th Cir. 1993). Wisconsin courts do not draw a distinction between
"strict responsibility misrepresentation" and strict liability misrepresentation;
Heiser Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., v. Hagemeier, No. 91-1783, 1992 Wise. App.
LEXIS 1293, at *4 (lst Dist. July 14, 1992). Persichini v. Brad Ragan, Inc.,
735 P.2d 168, 172 (Colo. 1987); Werkmeister v. Robinson Dairy, Inc., 669
P.2d 1042, 1045 (Colo. 1983) (stating that § 402B of Restatement (Second) of
Torts "imposes strict liability upon sellers of products... which are
misrepresented to the consuming public...."); American Safety Equip.
Corp. v. Winlder, 640 P.2d 216, 220-22 (Colo. 1982); Moorman Mfg. Co. v.
National Tank Co., 435 N.E.2d 443, 452 (I11. 1982); Nugent v. Utica Cutlery
Co., 636 S.W.2d 805, 808-09 (Tex. 1982); Baugh v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd.,
727 P.2d 655, 667 (Wash. 1986).
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965). Section 402B
states:
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising,
labels, or otherwise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a
material fact concerning the character or quality of a chattel sold by him
is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of the chattel
caused by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
1993]
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There has been talk, among Professor Madden, Professor
Henderson, and others, about whether or not you should use the
date of trial29 or the date of manufacture 30 in determining what
the objective manufacturer could have done or could have
known. 3 1
Id.
28. See Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 577
(Ohio 1981) (citing Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 892
(Cal. 1962)) (stating that when manufacturer places a product on market, there
is an implied representation that it will "safely do the jobs for which it was
built. .. ."); Burrows v. Follett & Leach, Inc., 340 N.W.2d 485, 491 (Wis.
1983) (explaining that on the facts of that case, absence of any express
representations "as to the safety" of product, a finding of strict liability under
§ 402A was inappropriate).
29. See Gomulka v. Yarapi Mach. & Auto Parts, Inc., 745 P.2d 986, 989
(Ariz. 1987) (stating that in strict liability cases manufacturer's conduct at time
of manufacture is not material because knowledge of a product's risks is
imputed to manufacturer at time of trial); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d
876, 881 (Ariz. 1985) (stating that test is whether manufacturer would
continue to market his product with knowledge of risks at time of trial).
30. See Anderson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 810 P.2d 549, 556
(Cal. 1991) (stating that manufacturer is liable for "risks... known or
knowable at time of manufacture. ... "). According to the Anderson court, to
hold otherwise, would discourage the manufacturer from developing new
products because of the danger that advances in technology would result in
possible liability. Id. at 556.; Fireboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168,
1175 (Colo. 1993) (arguing that manufacturer's liability is based on knowledge
of product's risks at time of manufacture and distribution).
31. See Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 199 (I11. 1980)
(stating that "[t]o hold a manufacturer liable for failure to warn of danger of
which it would be impossible to know ... would make manufacturer virtual
insurer of the product."); Page Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning
of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACuSE L.
REV. 559, 569-71 (1969). The Keeton approach imputes knowledge to the
manufacturer at the time of trial, even if the risk was not known to the
manufacturer at the time of manufacture or distribution. Id.; John W. Wade,
On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L. J. 825, 834-35
(1973). While Keeton would find the manufacturer liable based on information
available at the time of trial, the approach taken by Wade would find the
manufacturer liable "if it had known of the product's dangerous condition at
the time it was marketed."; see also Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d
210 (3d Cir. 1991). The manufacturer is liable for known and unknown
product risks. Id. at 216. "This rule can be justified because it provides
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Professor Twersd stated that only a small minority of
jurisdictions use the date of trial time. 32 Washington was
mentioned. 3 3 I believe Pennsylvania is such a jurisdiction. 34
Arizona is such a jurisdiction in Dart v. Wiebe Manufacturing,
Inc.35 I believe Hawaii is also such a jurisdiction in asbestos
manufacturers with an incentive to invest, not only in proven safety features,
but also in the testing and development of any new feature that may prove
superior." Id.
32. See Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210 (3d Cir. 1991); see
also In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 665 F. Supp. 1454 (D. Haw. 1986),
aff'd 960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1986); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876
(Ariz. 1985); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Wood v.
Ford Motor Co., 691 P.2d 495, 498 (Or. 1984), rev. denied, 697 P.2d 556
(Or. 1985) (stating that the "test is whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer
would have so designed and sold the product in question had it known of the
risk which injured plaintiff ....").
33. See Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 683 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Wash. 1984)
(stating that liability of manufacturer is based on characteristic of product and
not on conduct of manufacturer). But see Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby
Prods. Co., 818 P.2d 1337, 1344 (Wash. 1991) (stating that time of
manufacture is appropriate standard in determining whether product is
"reasonably safe as designed"); Falk v. Keene Corp., 782 P.2d 974, 980
(Wash. 1989) (declaring that to find the manufacturer liable, plaintiff must
prove that "at the time of manufacture, [the risk of harm to the
plaintiff] ... outweighs the manufacturer's burden to design a product that
would have prevented those harms ....").
34. See Habecker, 942 F.2d at 215-16. Under Pennsylvania law, evidence
of what was known about a product's safety feature is not relevant to whether
the product was defective. Id. The product itself is relevant, and not the
conduct of the manufacturer. Id. Therefore, the determination of whether the
product was defective is based on the knowledge available at the time of trial.
IL; Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Div., 528 A.2d 590, 594 (Pa. 1987) (stating that
manufacturer's liability in design defect case is based on knowledge of product
defect at time of trial and not on manufacturer's conduct in making design
choice).
35. 709 P.2d 876, 881 (Ariz. 1985). The Dart court found that, in a strict
liability risk/benefit analysis, unlike in a negligence setting, the focus should
be on the "quality of the end result," rather than on the conduct of the
manufacturer. ld. According to the court's "hindsight test," also known as the
"prudent manufacturer test[,]... the quality of the product may be measured
not only by the information available to the manufacturer at the time of design,
but also by the information available to the trier offact at the time of trial."
Id. (emphasis added); see also Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D.
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litigation. 36 I believe Federal Rule of Evidence 40737 also
supports such proposition when it states that you can use evidence
Pa. 1971), aft'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973). The Dorsey court declared
that "the proper test of 'unreasonable danger' was whether a reasonable
manufacturer would continue to market his product in the same condition as he
sold it to the plaintiff with knowledge of the potential dangerous consequences
the trial just revealed." Id. at 759-60; Byrns v. Riddell, Inc., 550 P.2d 1065,
1068 (Ariz. 1976); Barker, 573 P.2d at 457. According to the Barker court,
the fact that the manufacturer took reasonable precautions in an attempt
to design a safe product or otherwise acted as a reasonably prudent
manufacturer would have under the circumstances, while perhaps
absolving the manufacturer of liability under a negligence theory, will
not preclude the imposition of liability under strict liability principles if,
upon hindsight, the trier of fact concludes that the product's design is
unsafe to consumers, users, or bystanders.
Id.; Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978); Phillips v.
Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974). According to the Phillips
court,
the question of whether the design is unreasonably dangerous can be
determined only by taking into consideration the surrounding
circumstances and knowledge at the time the article was sold, and
determining therefrom whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer
would have so designed and sold the article in question had he known of
the risk involved which injured plaintiff.
Id. at 1037 (emphasis in original).
36. In re Hawaii Fed. Asbestos Cases, 665 F. Supp. 1454 (D. Haw.
1986), aff'd, 960 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1992). Due to its policy of providing
"consumers with the maximum possible protection that the law can muster
against dangerous defects in products," the Hawaii Supreme Court decided that
this policy would be furthered by allowing the consumer to show the existence
of a design defect "under either or both" the consumer expectation test and the
risk-benefit/hindsight approach. Id. In other words, where the ordinary
consumer expectation test would be inadequate in the strict liability setting, the
Hawaii court was willing to protect the plaintiff by evaluating the product "in
the light of hindsight." Id. at 1456; see also Kisor v. Johns-Manville Corp.,
783 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1986). According to the Kisor court, "ignorance of
the product's danger is [no] defense to strict products liability." Id. at 1341.
37. FED. R. EVID. § 407. This rule provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously,
would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the
subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable
conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another
[Vol 10
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of remedial measures of anyone other than the defendant to show
the product was defective when made at a prior time. 38 You can
even use the defendant's improvements on the product where it is
introduced to show feasibility at the time the product was
made. 39 If you adopt the date of manufacture time to determine
defectiveness in strict liability, you must, it seems to me,
implicitly or explicitly overrule Rule 407, which the federal
courts4° and almost all state courts41 apply.
purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
Id.
38. In re Aircrash in Bali, India, 871 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir.) (stating that
a Federal Aviation Administration report on airline's safety procedures is not
excludable under Rule 407 where it is prepared by FAA and not by defendant),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 917 (1989); Koonce v. Quaker Safety Prod. & Mfg.
Co., 798 F.2d 700, 720 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that exclusion of a memo is
not required under Rule 407 for subsequent remedial measures where memo
was written by employer who was not a party in action); Middleton v. Harris
Press & Shear, Inc., 796 F.2d 747, 751 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that
modifications made subsequent to plaintiff's injury were admissible under Rule
407 when modifications were made by non-defendant); accord Dixon v.
International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 583 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that
Rule 407 does not bar evidence of repairs made by non-defendant); Grenada
Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 889 (5th Cir. 1983)
(stating that "neither the text of rule 407 nor the policy underlying it excludes
evidence of subsequent repairs made by someone other than the defendant.").
39. Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1523 (1st Cir. 1991)
(stating that Rule 407 does not exclude feasibility of precautionary measures);
Mills v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 886 F.2d 758, 764 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding
that where feasibility is not in controversy, Rule 407 exception does not
apply); Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 584 (5th Cir.
1985) (holding that although repairs are made years after product was
manufactured, evidence of repairs is admissible under feasibility exception of
Rule 407); Estate of Spinosa v. International Harvester Co., 621 F.2d 1154,
1160 (1st Cir. 1980) (stating that post-manufacture evidence cannot be used to
prove product was defective when manufactured, but only when feasibility
exception is controverted). See, e.g., Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848
(4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
40. The majority of circuits exclude subsequent measures as evidence, and
apply Rule 407. See Raymond, 938 F.2d at 1522 (holding explicitly that Rule
407 applies to strict liability cases); Chase v. General Motors Corp., 856 F.2d
17, 22 (4th Cir. 1988) (applying Rule 407 to negligence, as well as products
19931 163
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Moreover, the majority of courts recognize a post-sale duty in
negligence, at least to warn, when you discover you have
liability cases); Ault v. International Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1152
(Cal. 1974).
In the products liability area, the exclusionary rule of § 1151
[equivalent to Fed. R. Evid. 407] does not affect the primary conduct of
the mass producer of goods, but serves merely as a shield against
potential liability. In short, the purpose of § 1151 is not applicable to a
strict liability case ....
Id.; Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1986); Flaminio v. Honda
Motor Co., Ltd., 733 F.2d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that failure to
apply Rule 407 would deter subsequent measures by manufacturer); Grenada
Steel Indus., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (holding that
Rule 407 applies in strict liability cases); Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d
985, 991 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that "Fed. R. Evid. 407 is applicable to
products liability actions based on §402A of the Restatement."); Cann v. Ford
Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that "[t]he application of
those principles convinces us that although negligence and strict products
liability causes of action are distinguishable, no distinction between the two
justifies the admission of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in strict
products liability actions."), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982). Only two
circuits do not apply Rule 407 to strict products liability cases. Burke v. Deere
& Co., No. 92-1990, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 21878, at *19 (8th Cir. Aug.
27, 1993) (holding that existence of modification programs is admissible as
evidence of subsequent remedial measures necessary to prove strict liability
cases); Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 866 F.2d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir.
1989) (arguing that Rule 407 only applies to negligence cases); Herndon v.
Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1331 (10th Cir. 1983) (stating
that "where there is any reason for use of the evidence other than to establish
the defendant's negligence, Rule 407 should not apply."), cert. denied sub
nom. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 466 U.S. 958
(1984).
41. See, e.g., Ault, 528 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Cal. 1974):
In the products liability area, the exclusionary rule of § 1151
[equivalent to Fed. R. Evid. 407] does not affect the primary conduct of
the mass producer of goods, but serves merely as a shield against
potential liability. In short, the purpose of § 1151 is not applicable to a
strict liability case ....
Id.; Chart v. General Motors Corp., 258 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Wis. 1977)
(holding that evidence of subsequent remedial change is admissible in products
liability case under Wisconsin law); Fields v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
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marketed a defective product. 42 In some cases, there is a duty to
recall, as required by the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act,43 or by common law.44 In some of these instances,
42. See Andrulonis v. United States, 924 F.2d 1210, 1221 (2d Cir. 1991)
(stating that "a manufacturer... may incur liability for failing to warn of
newly discovered dangers in the use of a product that came to his attention
after manufacture or sale.") (quoting Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 274-
75, 461 N.E.2d 864, 871, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 385 (1984); Ierardi v.
Lorillard, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 420, 423 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (stating that "[tio
impose a post-sale duty to warn... where defect is not remedial, where
product is no longer being manufactured, and is no longer in use, [and] where
it would be impracticable to personally notify every consumer... would be a
perversion of [the duty to warn] doctrine."); Pfeiffer v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 771
F. Supp. 1133, 1139 (D. Kan. 1991) (holding that duty to warn is continuous,
and therefore, requires manufacturers to keep abreast of new developments as
overall policy to protect consumers); Walton v. Avco Corp., 610 A.2d 454,
459 (Pa. 1992) (holding that manufacturer has duty to warn after
manufacturing date in order to preserve and promote social policies behind
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A); Walton v. Avco Corp., 557 A.2d
372, 378-80 (Pa. 1989) (leaving question open as to how broad post-sale duty
to warn should be interpreted).
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1411-20 (1988). Section 1411 of the Act provides:
If a manufacturer-
(1) obtains knowledge that any motor vehicle or item of replacement
equipment manufactured by him contains a defect and determines
in good faith that such defect relates to motor vehicle safety; or
(2) determines in good faith that such vehicle or item of replacement
equipment does not comply with an applicable Federal motor
vehicle safety standard prescribed pursuant to section 1392 of this
title; he shall furnish notification to the Secretary and to owners,
purchasers, and dealers, in accordance with section 1413 of this
title, and he shall remedy the defect or failure to comply in
accordance with section 1414 of this title.
Id.
44. See Santiago v. Group Basil, Inc., 830 F.2d 413, 416 (1st Cir. 1987)
(per curiam) (holding that retailer or manufacturer will be liable for failing to
meet his or her duty to recall); Nichols v. Westfield Indus., Ltd., 380 N.W.2d
392, 398 (Iowa 1985) (holding that retailer is liable for failure to recall
defective product). But see, e.g., Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 755
F.2d 129, 135 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that since appellants could not support
legal duty to recall tire rims, negligence had not been established); Strunk v.
Lear Siegler, Inc., No. 91-2331L, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15684, at 12 (D.
Kan. 1992) (holding that there is no duty to recall under Kansas law).
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the duty is to recall, or repair, free of charge, where there are
post-sale duties that arise in negligence. 45
Some mention has been made here today about providing
clarity and precision to the law of tort liability. As a teacher of
tort law, one of the greatest bogeymen I have been subjected to
over time has been the concept of clarity and precision in the law
of torts, where it does not exist. 46 As we all know, the law of
torts reflects the thinking of the common person in this country,
and it involves large social and policy judgments that are not
reducible to a formula. 47
45. Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 263, 276, 461 N.E.2d 864, 872, 473
N.Y.S.2d 378, 386 (1984). Post-sale duty to warn and/or duty to take other
steps, depends upon several factors:
the harm that may result from use of the product without notice, the
reliability and any possible adverse interest of the person, if other than
the user, to whom notice is given, the burden on the manufacturer or
vendor involved in locating the persons to whom notice is required to be
given, the attention which it can be expected a notice in the form given
will receive from the recipient, the kind of product involved and the
number manufactured or sold, and the steps taken, other than the giving
of notice, to correct the problem ... [and] any governmental regulation
dealing with notice.
Id.
46. See Jerry J. Phillips, Truth and Fiction in the Judicial Handling of
Statutes, 44 LA. L. REv. 1309, 1322 (1984) (stating that regulation of tort
law's "relatively imprecise standards" would inhibit its ability to "respond to
changing social needs"); see also Jerry J. Phillips, To Be or Not to Be:
Reflections on Changing Our Tort System, 46 MD. L. REv. 55, 60 (1986)
(explaining that fixed damages, for recovery in tort, will hinder law's ability
to adopt to changing circumstances).
47. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Justice, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 481, 503
(1986). According to Freyfogle, "[t]ort law has long had close ties to
community values and standards, and to shifting concepts of public morality.
Tort law, that is, is based on imprecision and judgments by local community
members .... " Id.; see also East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval,
Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 865 (1986) (justifying development of products liability
since policy of law of warranty did not give public sufficient protection from
dangerous products); Bellevue South Assocs. v. HRH Constr. Corp., 78
N.Y.2d 282, 304, 579 N.E.2d 195, 206, 574 N.Y.S.2d 165, 176 (1991)
(stating that policy behind tort law is to benefit society).
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However, if we try to obtain precision, and if we think risk
utility48 is precise, then you have not read the cases in this area
with any care.49 Certainly, an economist would be appalled at the
way attorneys present the issue of risk utility in the typical
products case. I think what they are appealing to, more often than
not, is the concept of the ordinary person's reaction, known as
the consumer expectations test, 50 or in the Uniform Commercial
48. KEETON Er. AL., supra note 1, at 699. According to § 99, a product,
under the risk utility approach, is defective when the danger (risk) of the
product outweighs its utility. Under this approach, a product is defective "if a
reasonable person would conclude that the danger-in-fact . . . outweighs the
utility of the product." Id.
49. See Griggs v. BIC Corp., 981 F.2d 1429 (3d Cir. 1992). Various
jurisdictions utilize different tests in determining a manufacturer's liability in a
design defect case. Id. at 1433. Some courts use "consumer expectations test,"
and other courts use the "risk-utility test." Id.; Camacho v. Honda Motor Co.,
Ltd., 741 P.2d 1240, 1246 (Colo. 1987) (stating that consumer contemplation
test is not satisfactory standard for determination of manufacturer's liability for
product defects), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988); Ziegler v. Kawasaki
Heavy Indus., Ltd., 539 A.2d 701 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), cert. denied, 542
A.2d 858 (1988). In some cases, the risk is not reasonable. Id. at 705. The
consumer contemplation has been held inapplicable where "the consumer
would not know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the
product could be made." Id. at 706; Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc.,
707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986). Determining when a manufacturer is liable for a
product defect has been one of the most controversial issues in products
liability. Id. at 376. Courts have applied the consumer contemplation test, as
well as the risk utility test. ld. "Mhe precise contours" of the risk utility test
varies from "court to court." Id. at 376, n.7. Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg.
Co., 79 A.D.2d 287, 436 N.Y.S.2d 480 (4th Dep't 1981), aff'd, 56 N.Y.2d
550, 434 N.E.2d 1345, 449 N.Y.S.2d 967 (1982). A design defect case using
risk utility analysis, involves a subjective judgment "on matters that are
frequently scientific. . . . [Tihe process is imprecise and in all fairness the
inquiry should be limited to technology which exists at the time of
manufacture." Id. at 294, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 485; Ernest J. Weinrib,
Understanding Tort Law, 23 VAL. U. L. REv. 485, 486 (1989) (declaring that
"need for theoretical clarity" is most urgent in tort law).
50. See, e.g., Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248 (Miss.
1993) (following trend of risk-utility analysis); see Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., Inc.,
709 P.2d 876, 880 (Ariz. 1985) (holding that consumer expectation test should
only be used "when the consumer may form an expectation .... "); Ewen v.
McLean Trucking Co., 706 P.2d 929, 934 (Or. 1985) (explaining that jury
instructions should focus on amount of risk perceived by ordinary consumer);
1993]
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Code,51 as reasonably fit for the purposes for which the product
was made.52
I have always felt the consumer expectations test -- defined in
terms of seller presumed knowledge53 and in terms of subsequent
developments in the industry, 54  and in terms of the
representational factors -- more nearly strikes at what the average
person on the jury does when she or he makes a judgment in this
type of case. 55 It is the test that is reflected in the Uniform
see also Barnes v. Vega Indus., 676 P.2d 761, 763 (Kan. 1984) (stating that
"[t]he definition of 'unreasonably dangerous' set forth in Comment i of §
402A has been designated the 'consumer expectation' test .... "); Phillips v.
Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1034, 1036 (Or. 1974) (holding that a
"dangerously defective article" is defined as one that "a reasonable person
would not put into the stream of commerce if he had knowledge of its harmful
character....") (emphasis in original).
51. U.C.C. § 2-314 (1993).
52. U.C.C. § 2-314(2) (1993). This provision states, in relevant part:
"Goods to be merchantable must be at least such ts... c) are fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." Id.
53. Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1036 (holding that test for strict liability is
"whether the seller would be negligent if he sold the article knowing of the risk
involved"). According to the Phillips court, "the two standards are the same
because a seller acting reasonably would be selling the same product which a
reasonable consumer believes he is purchasing." id. In other words, "a
manufacturer who would be negligent in marketing a given product.., would
necessarily be marketing a given product which fell below the reasonable
expectations of consumers who purchase it." Id. at 1037.
54. See, e.g., George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1990)
(stating that manufacturer has a duty to keep up with discoveries in his field);
Linday v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980)
(stating that a manufacturer must "keep abreast of the current state of
knowledge of its products .... "); Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 274, 461
N.E.2d 864, 871, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 385 (1984) (stating that a manufacturer
is expected to warn of dangers which come to light); Young v. Robertshaw
Controls Co., 104 A.D.2d 84, 87-88, 481 N.Y.S.2d 891, 894 (3d Dep't 1984)
(stating that a manufacturer must respond to evidence that product is
dangerous).
55. See Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 254 (Miss.
1993); Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568, 577 (Ohio
1981) (stating that "[a] product will be found unreasonably dangerous if it is
dangerous... beyond the expectations of an ordinary consumer when used in
an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.").
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Commercial Code, which is enacted in all states of this country,
with the exception of Louisiana. 56 It is the test reflected in the
standard of the European Economic Community, 57 which by the
56. See Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 113 (La.
1986). Louisiana requires plaintiff to demonstrate:
that the harm resulted from the condition of the product, that the
condition made the product unreasonably dangerous to normal use, and
that the condition existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's
control. Under a pure strict liability theory, the product is on trial, not
the knowledge or conduct of the manufacturer.
Id. The knowledge, possessed by the manufacturer, is implicated in strict
products liability only when plaintiff alleges either that the manufacturer failed
to issue an adequate warning, or that the manufacturer should have adopted a
safer product design. Id. Essential to plaintiff's case, under each of the three
theories, is that "defendant's product was unreasonably dangerous to normal
use." I& A product is considered "unreasonably dangerous" when the product
that produced plaintiff's injury "was dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by [an] ordinary consumer." DeBattista v. Argonaut-
Southwest Ins. Co., 403 So. 2d 26, 30 (La. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 836
(1982). Additionally, certain products are classified "unreasonably dangerous
per se." Halphen, 484 So. 2d at 113. Within this class, liability is "imposed
solely on the basis of the intrinsic characteristics of the product irrespective of
the manufacturer's intent, knowledge or conduct." Id. A product is categorized
as "'unreasonably dangerous per se' if a reasonable person would conclude
that the danger-in-fact of the product, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs
the utility of the product." Id. at 114. Regarding the application of products
liability in Louisiana, see Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So. 2d 585 (La.
1980); Chappuis v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 358 So. 26 926 (La. 1978); Weber
v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 754 (La. 1971); Addison v.
Williams, 546 So. 2d 220 (La. Ct. App. 1989); LeBleu v. Homelite Div. of
Textron, 509 So. 2d 563 (La. Ct. App. 1987); But see La. Prod. Liab. Act
§ 2800.56 (1988), infra note 84.
57. 28 O.J. EuR. CoM,,. (L 210) 29, art. 1 (1985). On July 25, 1985, the
European Economic Community (EEC) adopted a uniform products liability
directive which holds "[t]he producer [strictly] liable for damage caused by a
defect in his product." Id. The directive defines "defect" as follows:
1. A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a
person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account,
including: (a) the presentation of the product; (b) the use to which it
could reasonably be expected that the product would be put; (c) the time
when the product was put into circulation. 2. A product shall not be
considered defective for the sole reason that a better product is
subsequently put into circulation.
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way, folds into its test a product "get-up" standard, which is
representational in nature. 58 The European community, with
whom we are becoming ever more closely tied economically,
uses what I believe to be the consumer expectations test. I think it
would be unfortunate for the American Law Institute at this time
to steer away from the standard used both by the Code and by the
European community. 59
The consumer expectations test has been criticized on two
grounds: (1) the consumer can have no expectation of safety
when the danger is obvious, 60 and (2) the consumer has no
ordinary expectations in the case of a complicated design
question, requiring expert testimony. 61 I think both criticisms are
misplaced.
A consumer can certainly expect greater safety even though she
is exposed to an obvious danger. 62 To say that she cannot, is
Id. at art. 6. See generally Gregory G. Scott, Product Liability Laws in the
European Community in 1992, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 357 (1992).
58. See Peter DeVal & R.J. Dormer, Developments in English Products
Liability Law: A Comparison with the American System, 62 TUL. L. REV.
353, 364 (1988).
59. See generally ROBERT E. CARTWRIGHT & JERRY J. PHILLIPS,
PRODUcTS LIABILITY § 1.08 (1986 & Supp. 1992).
60. See, e.g., Mavilia v. Stoeger Indus., 574 F. Supp. 107, 111 (D. Mass.
1983) (stating that in wrongful death action brought by decedent's wife against
manufacturer and designer of gun which had been fired at decedent by an
unnamed assailant, court dismissed claim, asserting that "death may result
from careless handling of firearms [which] is known by all Americans from an
early age."); Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co.,
230 N.W.2d 794, 799 (Wis. 1975) (concluding that "the average consumer
would be completely aware of the risk of harm to small children ... when the
[pool's] retractable ladder is left in a down position and the children are left
unsupervised.").
61. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1034 (Or. 1974). At
least one court has suggested that a "knowledgeable seller test" be substituted
for the consumer expectations test under such circumstances. id. The court in
Phillips defined a dangerously defective product as "one which a reasonable
person would not put into the stream of commerce if he had knowledge of its
harmful character." Id. at 1036 (emphasis in original).
62. But see Koske v. Townsend Eng'g Co., 551 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Ind.
1990) (stating that a "plaintiff who had actual knowledge and appreciation of
the specific danger and voluntarily accepted the risk. . ." should be denied
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about as antiquated as saying that an employee assumes the risks
of a dangerous workplace, 63 and therefore has no expectations of
safety. Both doctrines have been rejected in modem
jurisprudence. 64
Where the question of causation or defectiveness presents a
complicated issue about which the average consumer - as
embodied in the deliberations of the lay jury - has no immediate
expectations, then, those expectations have to be informed by
expert testimony. That is exactly what we do in negligence cases,
and we can do the same in strict products liability as well. 65
Professor Henderson talked earlier about the undesirability of
using the tort system primarily as a method of social insurance, 66
and with that I fully agree. I think it is a mistake to say that
recovery where product is defective); Ulrich v. Kasco Abrasives Co., 532
S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1976) (explaining that failure of consumer to keep dangerous
machinery in optimum working order may preclude recovery if product is
found unreasonably dangerous).
63. See CARTWRIGIHT & PHILLIPS, supra note 59, § 8.41 (1986) (stating
that "[m]any courts have sustained verdicts for plaintiff, especially where
product is used by plaintiff in a daily job, and manufacturer has failed to equip
it with an entirely possible, often inexpensive, safety device.").
64. See Perkins v. Spivey, 911 F.2d 22, 29 (8th Cir. 1990) (abandoning
defense of assumption of risk by employer since "employer's common law
duty to provide a safe workplace was intended to protect employees from
unsafe workplaces where they could suffer physical injury."), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1309 (1991); Ford v. El Dorado & Wesson R.R., 848 F.2d 911,
913 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that "assumption of risk is not a defense under
FELA [Federal Employment Liability Act]" where employee was injured at
workplace); see also Wren v. Sullivan Elec., Inc., 797 F.2d 323, 326 (6th
Cir. 1986) (stating that "Tennessee law imposes on [employer]... obligation
to protect its own employees authorized to be on the site by providing a safe
workplace, and.., thus provide[s] to all workers on the site a workplace free
from the specific hazards envisioned in the regulations."); Micallef v. Miehle,
384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 348 N.E.2d 571 (N.Y. 1976) (leading case reflecting
obviousness of danger as a bar to recovery); Rhodes v. Service Mach. Co.,
329 F. Supp. 367 (D.C. Ark. 1971) (obviousness of danger is no bar in
workplace product injury).
65. See Karns v. Emerson Elec. Co., 817 F.2d 1452, 1459 (10th Cir.
1987) (permitting expert to testify that product was "unreasonably dangerous
beyond the expectation of the average user.").
66. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Revising Section 402,4: The Limits of
Tort as Social Insurance, 10 TOURO L. REV. 107, 118 (1993).
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social insurance is the primary goal of tort law. 67 Tort law is
indeed designed to compensate, 68 but nothing can do that like a
well administered and cost effective social insurance system. I do
not think there is any doubt about that. But to me, it has always
been the primary thrust of tort law to do justice and to effect
fairness, to provide the consumer with a feeling that she has had
67. But see Mauro v. McCrindle, 70 A.D.2d 77, 82, 419 N.Y.S.2d 710,
714 (2d Dep't 1979). The court stated that
as a means of social insurance, in certain situations liability has been
imposed irrespective of fault.., thereby removing the potential burden
of loss from the innocent victim and placing it upon another, largely
innocent, party who is in a better position to spread the risk upon
society as a whole.
Id., aft'd, 52 N.Y.2d 719, 417 N.E.2d 567, 436 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1980); James
Fleming, Jr., Social Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative
Remedies, 27 N.Y.U. L. REv. 537, 540 (1952) (discussing social insurance
philosophy as mixed in with tort liability).
68. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-55 (1978) (holding that major
principle of damages is that of compensation where defendant has breached his
duty toward plaintiff); Ball v. Chicago, No. 92-3358, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS
20620, at *17 (7th Cir. Aug. 12, 1993) (applying monetary sanction);
Richmond v. Madison Management Group, Inc., 918 F.2d 438, 446 (4th Cir.
1990) (stating that "[r]ecovery in tort is available only when there is a breach
of a duty to take care for the safety of the person or property of another.");
McKay v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 704 F.2d 444, 453 (9th Cir. 1983)
(explaining that "[ilf the product proves to be defective, consumers should
receive compensation for disappointment of their reasonable expectations of
safety."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984); Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling
& Neale, Architects, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55, 58 (Va. 1988) (holding that tort




Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 1 [1993], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss1/9
A MISGUIDED REVISION
her day in court, 69 and to provide a safety incentive to create
safer products. 70
There is empirical and other literature written as to whether tort
law provides any effective means of deterrence, particularly
regarding strict liability. 71 There is, interestingly, the same type
of argument that has continued over the years in the area of
criminal law. For example, does punishment provide any sort of
effective deterrent on the criminal? I have heard no one in this
country calling for the abolition of the criminal law simply
because it cannot be proven whether it is an effective deterrent. It
also provides many other valuable social goals in society, as does
tort law in its presumed deterrent effect. 72
69. See United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank,
620 F. Supp. 361, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that true goal of torts is to
promote fairness and to apportion loss), aff'd, 786 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1986);
Patterson v. Gesellschaft, 608 F. Supp. 1206, 1213 (N.D. Tex. 1985)
(explaining that "[o]ur tort law is premised upon fairness, making individuals
responsible for their own acts."); see also Michael E. Solimine, Activism and
Politics on State Supreme Courts: State Supreme Courts in State and Nation,
57 U. CN. L. REv. 987, 997 (1989) (book review) (stating that tort law
serves various purposes, one being fairness to the litigants).
70. McKay, 704 F.2d at 452 (9th Cir. 1983) The McKay court stated that a
"reason for imposing strict liability is to deter manufacturers from marketing
unsafe products by encouraging the use of cost-justified safety features. The
safer the product... the lower the costs of accidents[,]" which will, in turn,
reduce the purchase price and increase the sales of the product. Id.; Disaster At
Detroit Metro Airport, 750 F. Supp. 793, 801 (E.D.Mich. 1989) (stating that
"[tort law] encourage[s] the design of safe products, thereby reducing the
incidence of injuries by making the producer incur the monetary consequences
that are associated with defective goods.").
71. See William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1705, 1778 (1992) (stating that strict liability serves
deterrence purposes and provides a measure of additional insurance for
accident victims); David G. Owen, Alternative Compensation Schemes .and
Tort Theory: Deterrence and Desert in Tort, 73 CAL. L. REv. 665, 667 (1985)
(stating that "[pirior to the strict liability revolution in product warning
litigation, the tort law system did not deter significantly the distribution of
hazardous products by chemical manufacturers.").
72. See Jones v. Reagan, 696 F.2d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that
tort law has a deterrent function, "accomplished through the setting of
standards of conduct...."); Olin Corp. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp.,
807 F. Supp. 1133, 1141 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that tort law acts as a
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Finally, Professor Henderson, if I understood him correctly,
said at lunch today that the Reporters of the American Law
Institute, are currently thinking of a presumed seller's knowledge
or a true strict liability standard 73 for all products with the
exception of pharmaceutical and toxic products, 74 which, by the
way, is a very large exception. One must wonder why these
exceptions are contemplated. 75 Professor Madden pointed out
that the enterprise responsibility study, prepared under the
deterrent by providing a disincentive for wrongful behavior). Several courts do
recognize that one purpose of tort law is deterrence. See Campbell v. United
States, 962 F.2d 1579 (1 1th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1254 (1993);
Phillips v. Western Co. of N. Am., 953 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1992); Bell v.
Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Jerry J. Phillips, In
Defense of the Tort System, 27 ARIz. L. REv. 603, 612 (1985) ("In all events,
society demands or expects retribution. Assumed deterrence and expected
retribution are also important in the jusitfication for tort law.").
73. See Friedman v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 762, 765
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that true strict liability cases only ask whether "the
utility of the design choice outweighs its danger."); Larson v. Thomashaw,
307 N.E.2d 707, 717 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (applying a true strict liability
standard by relaxing burden of proof for plaintiff and only requiring that
plaintiff prove that product malfunctioned); Jarrell v. Monsanto Co., 528
N.E.2d 1158, 1169 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (Shields, P.J., concurring) (stating
that "the Indiana statute is a true strict liability statute in that the focus is upon
the condition of the product and not upon the seller's conduct.").
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1964).
Pharmaceutical products, "which are incapable of being made safe for intended
and ordinary use... properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions
and warnings, [are] not defective, nor [are they] unreasonably dangerous." Id.
Since the disease may lead to death, "both the marketing and the use of the
[drugs] are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidably high degree of risk
which they involve." Id. "Because of lack of time and opportunity for
sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety," and this,
not holding the seller of the products strictly liable, is justified. id.
Furthermore, such products are required to have directions or warnings on the
product, as to its use, so as "to prevent the product from being unreasonably
dangerous." Id. at cmt. j.
75. See 2 A.L.I. REPORTERS' STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY, ch. 12 (1991) (prepared for but not adopted by the
American Law Institute) (stating that strict liability is not always standard used
since applying this standard depends upon danger posed by product and value
of product to community).
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auspices of the American Law Institute, concluded that in the
case of toxic torts, strict liability should be retained. Why?
Because toxic substances are so dangerous. 76 In this area, strict
products liability begins to meld with the liability for
ultrahazardous conduct77 or abnormally dangerous activities, as
76. See In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). According
to the DES court,
Toxic torts possess some of the following features: (1) geographically
widespread exposure to potentially harmful agents that (2) affects a
large or indeterminate number of plaintiffs, (3) possibly over long time
periods, even generations, (4) in different ways such that (5) there is
difficulty in establishing a general theory of causation and (6) an
inablility to link a particular defendant's actions to a particular
plaintiff's injuries, as well as (7) difficulty in determining the number of
potentially responsible defendants and (8) in determining their relative
culpability, if any, which often results in (9) multiple litigations that
burden the courts and cause huge transaction costs, including heavy
legal fees, and (10) which threatens the financial ability of many
companies or of whole industries to respond to traditional damage
awards.
Id. at 562; see also T & E Indus. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249, 1255
(N.J. 1991) (stating that toxins are dangerous because they pose an unusual
threat to community); State Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp., 468
A.2d 150, 159 (N.J. 1983) (stating that "[p]ollution from toxic wastes that
seep onto the land of others and into streams necessarily harms the
environment."). The court in Ventron, also held that "disposal of toxic wastes
may cause a variety of harms, including ground water contamination via
leachate, surface water contamination via runoff or overflow, and poison via
the food chain." Id. at 159-60.
77. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1544-45 (10th Cir. 1992)
(stating that term ultrahazardous activity is synonymous with term
"abnormally dangerous activity" used by Restatement (Second) of Torts); T &
E Indus., 587 A.2d at 1259 (stating that under Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 519, "one who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to
liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the
activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.");
State Dep't of Envtl. Protect., 468 A.2l at 159 (N.J. 1983) (stating that
Restatement (Second) of Torts substituted standard of "abnormally dangerous"
for "ultrahazardous" under §§ 519 and 520); Russell-Stanley Corp. v. Plant
Indus., 595 A.2d 534, 539 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991) (explaining that
ultrahazardous standard has been replaced by abnormally dangerous activities
standard of Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 519 and 520); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 520 cmt. c (1977). According to
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defined by of the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 520.78 I
think the Reporters would do well to consider the
interrelationship between strict products liability and abnormally
dangerous activities, particularly in the area of toxic torts. 79
With regard to pharmaceuticals, I understand they are health-
giving, 80 and therefore, you can only test such products up to a
comment c, "[a] combination of factors stated in Clauses (a), (b) and (c), or
sometimes any one of them alone, is commonly expressed by saying that the
activity is "ultrahazardous." Furthermore, "[Il]iability for abnormally
dangerous activities is not.., a matter of these three factors alone." id.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). Section 520
provides:
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the
following factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person,
land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable
care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried
on; and
(0 extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its
dangerous attributes.
Id.
79. See Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1544 (stating that Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 519 applies strict liability to "abnormally dangerous" activities and
§ 520 contains factors "to weigh in determining whether an activity should
give rise to strict liability"); Russell-Stanley, 595 A.2d at 539, n.6 (stating
that "it is time to recognize expressly that the law of liability has evolved so
that a landowner is strictly liable to others for harm caused by toxic
wastes .... .") (quoting State Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Ventron Corp.,
468 A.2d 150, 159 (N.J. 1983)).
80. See Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 540
(6th Cir. 1993). The defendant, in Tobin, argued, correctly, that a drug
manufacturer should be shielded from liability under comment k of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, because comment k shields
manufacturers from liability for "highly useful and desirable product[s]
attended with a known but reasonable risk." id.; Mazur v. Merck & Co., 964
F.2d 1348, 1353 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992). The court stated in Mazur, that some
products, under the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment k, are
considered to be unavoidably unsafe products. id. These products usually are
in the field of drugs, and are incapable of being made safe. Id. A seller of such
176 [Vol 10
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certain point. Then, you have to stop and put the product on the
market, sometimes before knowing what the risks of the drug
may be. 81 But the uncertainty that exists with regard to
pharmaceuticals, and the utility of pharmaceuticals, is not
significantly different from that which exists with regard to other
products is usually "not held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences
attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with
an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known and
apparently reasonable risk." Id.; Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470, 479
(Cal. 1988) (stating that "[p]ublic policy favors the development and
marketing of beneficial new drugs, even though some risks, serious ones,
might accompany their introduction, because drugs can save lives and reduce
pain and suffering."); Hahn v. Richter, 628 A.2d 860, 871 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993) (Cavanaugh, J., concurring). A manufacturer of prescription drugs is
not subject to strict liability, under § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts because such products are useful and desirable. Id. Pharmaceuticals are
products "whose costs are considered by society to be more beneficial than
their potential harm." Id. at 870. Additionally, the Food and Drug
Administration "has the institutional capacity and legislative mandate for
weighing the costs and benefits for particular pharmaceuticals." Id. Therefore,
pharmaceuticals are held to a negligence standard rather than a strict liability
standard. Id. "Unlike other manufactured products, prescription drugs play a
significant role in dissipating suffering and in prolonging human life." Id.
81. See Brown, 751 P.2d at 479 (stating that delaying new drugs from
entering market would not be beneficial to public, and that public policy
encourages marketing new drugs because drugs save lives and therefore
outweigh any risks that may arise); Hahn, 628 A.2d 860, 865 (stating that
some products, such as pharmaceuticals, are "incapable of being made safe for
[their] intended use... because of lack of time and opportunity for sufficient
medical experience there can be no assurance of safety, but such
experience... justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a
medically recognizable risk....") (citing Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d
206, 219-20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1971)); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37,
52 (Wis. 1984) (explaining that policy justification, under comment k of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, for eliminating strict liability for
pharmaceuticals, is the necessity to market new drugs "without adequate
testing because of the urgent need for treatment of a serious health
hazard.... ."); Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products and Strict
Products Liability: Wat Liability Rule Should Be Applied to the Sellers of
Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 KY. L.J. 705, 731 (1989-90) (explaining that
some product risks are not discoverable until product "has been on the market
for some time," and that such risks cannot be discovered prior to marketing
"by using existing scientific knowledge and technology .. ").
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socially useful products. To retain a pocket of negligence liability
for pharmaceuticals may be like the loss of the nail that caused
the loss of the shoe, and of the horse, and finally of the battle.
At least in their Cornell Law Review article, 82 Professors
Henderson and Twerski abjure the idea of having a generic
design defect concept, 83 which Louisiana, before its law was
revised by statute, 84 said was an appropriate way to look at a
product design. If the product could feasibly be made safe, but on
balance, is socially undesirable, the product should not be on the
market. 85
82. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of
Section 402 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512
(1992).
83. Id. at 1517. In design defect cases, a risk-utility test is necessary, since
"[p]roducts are not defective merely because their designs are dangerous." id.
To allow a generic design defect concept "would cause more careful product
users to subsidize less careful users, a result that would be both inefficient and
unfair." Id. "Risk-utility balancing is required to determine which risks are
more fairly and efficiently borne by product sellers . . . and which should be
borne by individual product users who suffer injury." Id. Under risk-utility
balancing, "knowledge of risks and risk-avoidance techniques reasonably
available at the time of distribution" is taken into account. Id. "To impose
liability for unforeseeable and hence incalculable risks would violate a
manufacturer's right to be held to a liability standard that it is capable of
meeting." Id.
84. Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 737 F.2d 462, 465-66 (5th
Cir. 1984) (stating that under Louisiana law, "manufacturer is presumed to
know the defects in its product," and that foreseeability is not an issue).
Halphen has been revised by LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2800.56 (West 1991),
which states in pertinent part:
A product is unreasonably dangerous in design if, at the time the
product left its manufacturer's control: (1) [t]here existed an alternative
design for the product that was capable of preventing the claimant's
damage; and (2) [t]he likelihood that the product's design would cause
the claimant's damage and the gravity of that damage outweighed the
burden on the manufacturer of adopting such alternative design and the
adverse effect, if any, of such alternative design on the utility of the
product.
Id.
85. Cf. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088-89
(5th Cir. 1973) (explaining that decision to market a "commercial product
possessing both unparalleled utility and unquestioned danger" requires a
[Vol 10
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Why should a jury not be able to determine, in a strict liability
context using the date of trial, with regard to, for example, such
products as DES, thalidomide, the Dalkon Shield and other such
products, that these products should never have been on the
market?86 This, it seems to me, is the type of decision that the
jury is most competent at making. Using risk-utility, the jury
makes that determination in a very rough sort of fashion. 87 But
determining issues such as the social utility of products and
whether they should even be on the market, 88 and whether or not
a substitute product, rather than a redesigned one, is the way to
balancing, and a warning of the risks); Davis v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 399 F.2d
121, 129 (9th Cir. 1968) (stating that polio vaccine requires warning of risks
before it can be properly marketed).
86. Gifaldi v. Jefferson Chem. Co., No. 91-CV-677E, 1992 WL 76980, at
*2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1992) (stating that it is for jury to decide whether a
product is safe enough to be put on market); O'Bara v. Piekos, 161 A.D.2d
1118, 1119, 555 N.Y.S.2d 939, 941 (4th Dep't 1990) (declaring that "it is for
... jury to determine... scope of ... product's intended purposes and
whether ... product was reasonably safe when placed in... stream of
commerce.").
87. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1087. The jury, as fulcrum in the risk-utility
balancing process, must realize that "product[s] have both utility and danger."
Id.
88. See, e.g., Duford v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 833 F.2d 407, 411 (1st
Cir. 1987) (stating that a product's "social utility" is one factor in determining
if its design is "unreasonably unsafe," and that courts must look at "whether
the risk of danger could have been reduced without significant impact on
product effectiveness and manufacturing cost....") (quoting Thibault v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843, 847 (N.H. 1978)); 1 M. STUART
MADDEN, PRODUCTS LL4,LrrY § 6.9, at 218 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that "only
safe products should be marketed, and.., safe products [are] those whose
utility outweighs the inherent risk."); see Kathryn Dix Sowle, Towards
Synthesis of Product Liability Principles: Schwartz's Model and the Cost-
Minimization Alternative, 46 U. MLAMI L. REV. 1, 8 (1991). In her article,
Sowle states that:
A sharp kitchen knife, for instance, would create an unreasonable risk if
the cost of blunting the knife were less than the expected accident costs
of sharp kitchen knives .... Thus, sharp kitchen knives would create a
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go, 89 is the type of decision which the jury is unusually well-
suited to make. 90
There are a number of ways to define true strict liability, if the
Reporters are of a mind to do so. Some of the ways are set forth
in an Appendix to my remarks, containing a suggested redraft of
section 402A. 9 1 I think the Reporters will make a grave mistake
89. See Friedman v. National Presto Indus., 566 F. Supp. 762, 764
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (discussing whether substituted products would add to the
expense).
90. See Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., 764 F.2d 1329, 1337 (9th Cir.
1985) (stating that jury is capable of evaluating social utility of Dalkon
Shield). But see Motter v. Everest & Jennings Inc., 883 F.2d 1223, 1227 (3d
Cir. 1989) (stating that design defect issue is given to jury after trial judge
conducts risk-balancing test); Hon v. Stroh Brewery Co., 835 F.2d 510, 512
(3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that jury gets case once trial court determines that
strict liability applies).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Proposed Redraft 1993).
The draft states:
(1) One who supplies a defective product is subject to liability for harm
to persons or property caused by the product defect if the supplier
is engaged in the business of supplying products of the kind
having the product defect.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies in the case of a claim based
on a defective product even though the supplier exercised all
possible care in the manufacture or marketing of the product.
(3) For purposes of Subsection (1) a defective product means a product
that
(a) is not fit for the ordinary purposes for which the product was
made,
(b) does not meet the expectations of the ordinary person,
(c) because of its dangerous condition would not be put on the
market by a reasonably prudent supplier assuming he knew
of its dangerous condition,
(d) is unduly dangerous,
(e) can practicably be made safer,
(f) has a practical substitute, or
(g) has been explicitly or implicitly misrepresented by the
supplier.
The above list of factors is not intended to be exclusive. A product
may be defective if one or more of the above or other relevant
factors applies.
(4) A determination of product defect shall be based on all relevant
evidence as of the date of trial.
[Vol I0
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if they try to define product defectiveness too narrowly, and if
they try to pigeonhole types of defects into manufacturing,
warning and design. 92 I think they will make an even greater
mistake if they try to return to negligence principles in defining
design, warning or any other defect. They will become bogged
down in the quagmire of foreseeability. 93
The noble experiment of section 402A should not be abandoned
so quickly, before it has hardly even taken root.94 Courts and
lawyers raised in a tradition of negligence law have had trouble
Id. Other examples of product-related terms that are multi-definitional include
"merchantability" and "abnormally dangerous activities."; see also UCC § 2-
314(2) (1993). Section 2-314(2) describes merchantable goods as those which
at least:
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract
description; and (b) in the case of fingible goods, are of fair
average quality within the description; and (c) are fit for the
ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and (d)
run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of
even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among
all units involved; and (e) are adequately contained,
packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and (f)
conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
Id.
92. See, e.g., UPLA, supra note 7, at 62,721; EPST, supra note 14, at
69; KEETON Er AL., supra note 1, at 695.
93. CARTw iGHT & PHiLLIPS, supra note 59, § 8.17 (1986).
Foreseeability is a concept rooted in negligence law and "has no place in strict
liability law." Id. at 967. As such, it retains all of the problems involved with
the "reasonable person" standard. Id. What is a foreseeable use for a product,
or what is a foreseeable injury must be determined on a fact-specific basis by
what a reasonable plaintiff or a reasonable manufacturer would have done
under the same or similar circumstances. Id. BLACK'S LAW DICONARY 619
(6th ed. 1990) (defining foreseeability as "ability to see or know in advance").
94. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Reision of
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1512
(1992). The revision of § 402A involves "changing the relevant language to
conform to current understandings" in the products liability area and not to
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in conceptualizing strict products liability. 95 But it can be done,
and it should be done. The high role of the American Law
Institute should be to do just that, and not to follow in the muddy
tracks of "tort reformers" who have already wreaked such havoc
on American tort and products liability law.
Strict liability can make a beneficial difference, and a very big
one, in products liability law. I am afraid we have become
indifferent to that fact. Our task, as judges, as litigators, and as
academicians, should be to make this important difference clear
to the public. Otherwise, we may find ourselves returning to the
antediluvian rules of 19th century tort law. 96 Thank you.
Hon. George C. Pratt:
Thank you, Professor Phillips.
95. Charles E. Cantu, Reflections on Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts: A Mirror Crack'd, 25 GONz. L. REv. 205 (1989-90).
Under strict liability (§ 402A), the privity requirement has been eliminated.
Id. at 231. Prior to the adoption of § 402A, an injured plaintiff could recover,
under strict liability, only in cases involving wild animals and unreasonably
dangerous activities. Id. at 205-06 Traditionally, under negligence law, the
manufacturer who placed a defective product on the market was able to avoid
liability by claiming lack of privity. Id.
96. See, e.g., Joseph A. Page, Deforming Tort Reform, 78 GEO. L.J. 649,
650 (1990) (reviewing PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL
REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988)). "Responding to pressure,
[from those demanding tort reform,] states enacted pro-defendant legislative
adjustments to . . . products liability and general tort law." id. at 659.
According to Professor Page, Peter Huber tries "to convince the general reader
that tort law has become mired in a 'poisonous swamp.'" Id.
32
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